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ABSTRACT 
 
     Spectrum utilization is the most recent communications issue which takes great 
deal of attention from communication researchers where most of the efforts have been 
dedicated for spectral efficient utilization. Spectrum sharing is one of the solutions 
considered in the problem of lack of available frequency for new communication 
services which are unlicensed. In this work we propose an optimal method for 
spectrum utilization to increase spectral efficiency. It considers the problem of 
spectrum holes found in Primary User's (PU) band and detected using one of the 
spectral sensing methods. The solution is formulated with the help of Game theory 
approach in such a way that the primary user who has unoccupied frequency can share 
it with a group of secondary users (SU) in a competitive way. One of the SUs will be 
a secondary primary user (SPU), share available frequency from PU then offer his 
sharing to serve other SUs in different rate of sharing. Each user in the group of 
secondary users has a chance to be secondary primary user depending on reputation of 
each SU. Enhancing reputation is the only way for any SU to assure a share in the 
spectrum where it considered the factor of increasing or decreasing rate of sharing as 
well as factor of being SPU or an ordinary SU. A theoretical non-cooperative game 
model is introduced in a comparison with a proposed non-dynamic technique which 
depends on number of subscribers who occupy frequency in each time period. Multi-
users compete on sharing the frequency from one of the users who offers sharing at a 
time when he has low number of subscribers that occupy his band. It is found that 
non-dynamic sharing results in inefficient spectrum utilization which is one of the 
reasons of spectrum scarcity where this resource is allocated in fixed way. Spectrum 
sharing using game theory solves this problem by its ability to make users compete to 
gain highest rate of spectrum allocation according to the real requirement of each user 
at each time interval. The problem of urgent case is also discussed when the primary 
user comes back to using his band which is the specific band of sharing with the 
secondary users group. SPU makes it easy to unload the required band from multi-
users because PU does not need to request his band from each SU in the group.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
    Spectrum is considered the backbone of wireless communications and its allocation 
issues are becoming a problematic issue that is inadvisable to have a choice of its 
bandwidth without careful analysis of information theoretic limits. However, although 
there is increasing in wireless telecommunications and wireless internet services but 
the problem in lack of spectrum is both a pragmatic and perceptual problem. The 
problem of spectrum scarcity appears from poor utilization caused by spectrum use 
policy [1], this makes spectrum frequency is an expensive commodity. Some regions 
suffer from reaching full capacity in the cellular infrastructure while increasing 
demands in the market on such service, in other regions (for example, in many rural 
areas, a single broadcast TV source may be nearly 200 miles away and there is a little 
or no local TV service) there are significant opportunities to provide internet and 
telecommunications services using this under-utilized spectrum [2]. 
    Federal Communication Commissions (FCC) has studied frequency utilization and 
gave results in multiple allocations of all the frequency bands to show how the 
spectrum is crowd especially at the frequencies below 3GHz according to its useful 
characteristics. Figure 1.1 shows the spaces found in the frequencies between 0 and 
2.5GHz. OfCOM in the United Kingdom found that most of the radio frequency 
spectrum was inefficiently utilized [3], FCCs Spectrum Policy Task Force reported 
vast temporal and geographic variations in the usage of allocated spectrum with 
utilization ranging from 15% to 85%. These measurements seriously question the 
efficiency of the current regulatory regime [4]. The licensed users which have the 
right to use allocated band don't use it all the time. These are considered wasted 
frequencies that can be used by other users which are unlicensed.  
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Figure 1.1:    0-2.5GHz spectrogram taken at BWRC over 9 minute intervals; green color 
indicates empty spectrum. [3] 
 
    This problem made many regulators issued new rules and programs to get full 
advantages from the spectrum and unlicensed bands as follows [2]:   
 
1- Federal Communication - Recommends opportunistic usage of wireless 
technologies in TV bands. 
2- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency – Allow multiple users to share the 
spectrum through adaptive mechanisms.   
3- US Army – Has been researching the so called “Adaptive Spectrum Exploitation”      
for real time spectrum management in battlefield.        
    The basic principles of the three above programs are if the radio devices can 
explore the wireless spectrum and locate sparsely-used spectral bands, they can 
exploit these bands in an opportunistic way to improve not only the devices’ 
performance but also the overall spectrum utilization. 
 
     Several researches have focused in this area and suggested different methods for 
optimal utilization of the frequency. One such method for implementing above   
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recommendations and programs is 'Opportunistic Spectrum Sharing' mechanism. In 
this mechanism we can classify the wireless users into two types: 
 Primary Users (PU): are the licensed users those who are allocated frequency 
bands by the regulatory body as they pay for using these bands therefore they 
have the right and the authorization to utilize their frequency so they have the 
first priority.   
 Secondary Users (SU): are unlicensed users those who need to use some bands 
of the frequency which are allocated to the primary users but they have no 
authorization for using them. 
    The FCC legalized a utilization type that gives the right to the secondary users to 
share the spectrum with the primary users at the time when the frequency isn’t used 
by the primary user on the following conditions: Firstly don’t cause an interference 
with the primary users and secondly the SUs must vacant the band as soon as possible 
when it has been needed by PU and always sensing the environment to stop the 
frequency using when the SU finds that PU become active again.  
1.2 Aim of the Research 
     In this thesis the best methods are investigated used for spectral allocations and 
opportunistic utilization to the allocated spectrum bandwidths. The main objective of 
the research is identifying a method that can make spectrum sharing among multi-user 
possible. Cognitive radio technique is the candidate method for this purpose as it has 
the ability to measure, sense, and learn the environment in order to find where and 
when can we use the spaces which may be found in the allocated bands and then we 
need a decision on how and who can use these spaces. Game Theory is one of the 
methods used for making a rational decision; it has deferent types, in our research we 
used non-cooperative method as this assumes that there is no cooperation among 
users. There are different types of scenarios which can be implemented to achieve this 
goal. One of such methods depends on the using of the spectrum allocated by license. 
This method called licensed users as Primary Users and we want to use the spaces in 
their bands by sharing among multi unlicensed (Secondary) users in a competitive 
way. 
                                                                                  Spectrum Utilization Using Game Theory                                      
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1.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
     In this research we identified a method that can be used to utilize the spectrum 
allocated to (PU) using the Game Theory. This method is considered the best way for 
making a rational decision, assuming that there is scanning to the environment to 
sense the spaces in the bands used by (PU) and it intends to share its frequency with 
multi secondary users in a competitive manner. The benefit then returns to both 
primary user that can get revenue from selling its own spectrum, and secondary users 
by subleasing available channels. The scenario can be put according to the agreement 
between (PU) and (SUs), so we assume the price is a unit price with number of 
categories each SU has one of these categories and will compete with other SU 
according to number of units it obtained. The contribution in this work is to propose a 
new method of sharing among multi-secondary users to compete on the available 
frequency by considering one of the SUs in the group as a primary secondary user 
who serve other users. The choice of the SU to be primary SU depends on each user’s 
reputation according to its need of sharing which assure maximum rate of utilization 
and minimize the time. The contribution in this work can be illustrated by the 
following points:  
1. Find a new method of spectrum allocation as poor utilization within one 
hundred years of spectrum sharing came from fixed frequency allocations 
which led to fracturing in spectrum utilization [5]. Therefore, this work can be 
used as a new method of allocation also, which means if there is unlicensed 
band intended to be allocated to users, then this band could be rented to multi-
user at same time. Each user can benefit from the frequency band according to 
his real demand at a specific time, and then no lost of frequency found because 
no user will request to use the band only if he needs. It can be used as spectral 
management method to allocate frequency by this way rather than fixed 
allocation.    
2. In this research we found  a mathematical model formulated which can be 
used to utilize the spectrum using the Game Theory as it is considered the best 
way for making a rational decision.  
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3. A new method of sharing among multi-secondary users (SUs) has been 
proposed to compete on the available frequency found in primary user’s band 
by considering one of the SUs in the group as a secondary primary user who 
serves other users after taking his demand from the available band. The choice 
of the SU to be primary SU depends on each user’s reputation according to its 
need of sharing which assure maximum rate of utilization and minimize the 
time.  
4. Solving urgent case problem when PU needs from SUs to quickly vacate the 
band in such a way makes it easy because PU has to request band vacating 
from one user always (i.e. the secondary primary user).  
5. Increase spectral efficiency by finding best method for spectrum utilization as 
it is (i.e. spectrum) a scarce resource. 
6. Contribute to encourage development of wireless technology if we could 
provide enough resource for implementation. 
7. Develop the market, as it could be considered as an economically successful 
business then new products and services will be found. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 introduces literature review of the spectrum efficient utilization related to 
spectrum managements and the ITU models and its recommendations about the best 
rules for managing the spectrum. Monitoring also discussed as an important key of 
spectrum management. Then spectrum efficiency has been illustrated for both low and 
high efficiency with the main important methods used in this field then cognitive 
technique explained as one of the most recent and the candidate mechanism for 
spectral efficient utilization so it takes separate section. 
Spectrum sensing which considered as one of the important tasks in the cognitive 
cycle, is discussed in Chapter 3 which shows the main concepts, sensing dimensions, 
and some of previous researches on this subject are viewed too.   
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Chapter 4 introduces game theory with its basic concepts and definitions and its 
relation with communication systems. 
Chapter 5 proposes 'Non-Dynamic Spectrum Allocation' methodology and 
mechanisms with its results. 
In chapter 6 method and numerical results of the second method used for efficient 
spectrum utilization 'Spectrum Sharing using Game Theory' has been proposed. A 
comparison between the two methods proposed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 is also 
illustrated in this chapter. 
Chapter 7 concludes the work of this research and suggests future modifications 
which can be applied to the model explained in chapter 6 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Spectrum Utilization 
    Soaring number of mobile service subscribers, the huge numbers of viewers and 
listeners to television and radio, the transition to digital broadcasting, and the new 
wireless technology as Wi-Fi and WiMAX radio access where all of these require the 
radio spectrum, demonstrate that there is a great importance of the spectrum. In 
addition, the importance of the spectrum came from its direct relation with the 
national security and emergency services and because of increasing the demands for 
interference-free frequency assignments, then it is necessary to have international 
coordination and manage this wealth efficiently, where the ITU plays a particular 
role.[6]  
 
Figure 2.1: Spectrum Occupancy in six locations [7] 
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    Communication researches are focused on spectral research as it considered a 
national resource. The research results on the spectral efficiency proved that there is 
bad utilization of the frequency. Figure 2.1 shows the average of the spectrum 
occupancy as an example of six locations [7] 
2.1 Spectrum Management: 
       Spectrum management has two central issues they are, price and allocation. 
Choices in allocation issue are depending on competing uses. There are many 
applications uses spectrum as resource. The spectrum usage is different from 
application to another one where: 
 Several applications don't matter on which frequency, they work on any 
frequency. 
  Some applications can work on different frequencies but on a specific range.  
  Some applications can work on different amounts of spectrum. 
       Allocation decisions for available frequency range have been made in competing 
way among applications or services and implemented in two stages under traditional 
management of spectrum. According to international agreement, first stage is taken 
place by allocating frequency to particular applications. Second stage is depend on the 
base "first-come, first-served", where particular frequencies are allocated to certain 
operators within the applications assigned in first stage. The operators have assigned 
frequencies are charged rate of fees according to revenues expected from operators' 
services. New technologies provide applications or services with higher frequency 
opportunities; the problem is when this frequency is already allocated to operators or 
other applications. Development in the spectrum technology is growing faster than 
movement in spectrum regulation. The frequency become more scarce and valuable 
with the new communications technology and widening range of services which 
require radio spectrum as a resource of implementations. That leads to necessitating in 
spectrum efficient utilization. Inertia and legacies of licensees and bad spectrum 
management caused inefficiency in spectrum field. 
 Spectrum Utilization Using Game Theory     
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    The public sector in United Kingdom holds about half the spectrum below 15 GHz, 
the largest user is the UK Ministry of Defense. This also one of the spectral 
inefficiency reasons because public sectors use spectrum inefficiently. [6]  
ITU developed and implemented four radio spectrum management models: 
 The traditional “command-and-control” model, it gives spectrum use the 
harmonization, therefore it can develop "economies of scale" and reduce costs 
of equipment manufacturing to benefit both manufacturers and customers. So 
it is considered by some as the most suitable model for "public interest 
policies".  
 A “market-based property rights” model where exclusive usage rights and 
spectrum trading and pricing is involved. It should provide Incentive to change 
technology of applications which are spectral-based and usage that yield in 
different degree of harmonization and production falling costs.  
 The “commons” or “unlicensed” model is "open" model that it is available to 
all users on a shared basis, but in conditions: 
1- They should have certain technical limits determined previously "(e.g., 
total transmission power/output limits)".  
2- For interference avoidance, equipment certification is required. 
It has the following features 
1- Usage rights flexibility. 
2- Lowers the limitations on access to radio spectrum usage. 
3- Opens effective spectrum allocation in case of absence of centralization. 
4- As a result, it develops market by quicker new market entry. 
5- Develops technological spectrum-efficient applications (e.g. Wi-Fi) 
because of its above features. 
     The only limitation of this model is that it may encourage overuse spectrum 
while the efficient use of alternative resources are required.  
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     An “easement” model, it depends on intelligent or smart technologies. The model 
based on the market-based and commons approaches. It was implemented more 
recently when there was scarcity in spectrum, so it can only be used where there are 
spaces in spectrum use. The intelligent or smart technologies enable spectrum sharing. 
They allow to unlicensed users of devices (called them as secondary users) to use 
spectrum in the same frequencies which used by licensed users the only users who 
have the rights to use this spectrum. 
       It is clear from all above that: 
1- The ICT sector has been developed in field of spectrum management policy, 
where it was limited to pure "command and control" then become including 
the other three models with more contributions. 
2-  It is impossible to apply a single model in all situations. 
3-  Higher flexibility is preferred from many operators in using their allocated 
spectrum. 
     ITU has discussed the regulators problems and their challenge in achieving a 
balance among the four models to find the best for their circumstances. Spectrum 
management takes very important place in the agenda of regulatory in developing 
countries since wireless is the most popular technology in these countries. [6]  
 
2.1.1 Key Spectrum Management Functions:  
 
• Spectrum Planning 
• Spectrum Engineering 
• Spectrum Authorization 
• Spectrum Monitoring 
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      Planning, authorization and engineering keys are depending on the information 
received from monitoring key as data base to do their functions properly; therefore, 
we need to know what is monitoring [8].  
2.1.2   Monitoring 
         Monitoring is calculated detailed information to be supplied to the Spectrum 
Planning and Authorization so it can be defined as determinations to support the 
proper functioning of the general process of spectrum management  
 
2.1.2.1 Why Monitoring?  
 
• Information on the technical or operational characteristics of radio systems can 
be obtained from monitoring.  
• Monitoring helps regulatory bodies in implementing rules and regulation by 
providing them with information used to determine if there is compliance with 
these rules and with technical and operational standards. 
• It supplies spectrum manager with general measurements used in planning of 
channel and band usage and assure the effectiveness of current planning and 
the activities of authorization.   
• Spectrum managers need to avoid incompatible usage and prevent 
interference, so spectrum monitoring helps them in this function and in 
identifying harmful interference sources.  
• Spectrum occupancy and the statistical information about its technical and 
operational nature can be provided by spectrum monitoring. 
• Organized crime can be detected and combated with the help of spectrum 
monitoring. [8]  
 
2.1.2.2 International monitoring system  
 
      Member countries of the International Telecommunication Union cooperate 
among them in the operation of an international monitoring system, because it is 
Spectrum Sensing 
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uneconomical and inefficient operational to develop and duplicate the monitoring 
facilities. They need monitoring facilities operation to ensure that the frequencies use 
is compliant with the internationally planned spectrum framework. According to the 
monitoring determination, ITU sends an infringement report for non-compliance 
condition to the country which has infringed via the "Radio communication Bureau". 
     Spectrum monitoring is provided with accurate, complete and timely information 
on current assignments and licenses from spectrum authorization and spectrum 
engineering functions. The benefit of this information is to compare the level of 
spectrum use or occupancy with assignments in order to use the spectrum resource 
efficiently [9].  
 
2.1.2.3 Who is responsible of Monitoring?  
 
• Spectrum Regulators. 
• Defense departments. (Have responsibility over frequencies allocated to 
governmental use). 
• Transport departments. (Have responsibility over frequencies allocated to 
governmental use). 
• Private sector participants in fields of industry associations, advisory and 
councils. 
       Regulators are different in dependency where some of them are independent 
agencies, and others are attached to the Ministry of Telecommunications. [8] 
 
2.2 Efficient Spectral Utilization  
 
Spectral Efficiency can be defined as a scale of a radio performance to measure 
the traffic load which can pass through a given bandwidth or the quantity of users or 
services that can be simultaneously supported by a limited radio frequency bandwidth. 
If we have a given traffic load we need to increase spectral efficiency to optimize the 
service. 
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      ITU-R Recommendation SM.1046-1 on “DEFINITION OF SPECTRUM USE 
AND EFFICIENCY OF A RADIO SYSTEM” mentions that efficient spectrum 
utilization is achieved by one of the following methods: 
 Geographical spacing 
 Frequency sharing 
 Time-sharing or time division 
 Orthogonal frequency use  
 The isolation obtained from antenna directivity 
     Spectrum Utilization factor, U, is the product of the frequency bandwidth, the 
geometric (geographic) space, and the time denied to other potential users [10]: 
U = B. S. T                                                                                                                (2.1) 
Where,   B: Frequency bandwidth,   S: geometric space (usually area)   and      
T: time.  
      The area here is considered as an important factor in spectrum utilization and can 
be classified into regions for example: Urban, Suburban, and Rural, as shown in 
figure (2.2). The traffic density is different from one area to another and the spectrum 
utilization will be different accordingly. [10] 
      In cellular radio system the spectrum efficiency can be expressed in several ways 
such as number of channels per cell, Erlangs per square kilometer, number of users 
per square kilometer. [11] 
 
Figure (2.2): Area classification [10] 
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2.2.1 Low Spectral Efficiency 
 
      Low spectral efficiency values are obtained when: 
 
• Given data rate (b/s) is transmitted through a very large bandwidth. 
• Very small data rate (b/s) transmitted through a given bandwidth. 
• No large bandwidth & no small data rate, but a large number of receive 
antennas 
2.2.2   Methods of Efficient Spectral Utilization   
    We can utilize spectrum efficiently by:- 
 
2.2.2.1 Organize geographical spacing 
 
    As in equation 2.1, the definition of the spectral efficiency factor depends on 
frequency bandwidth, geometric space and time, one of the methods of increasing 
spectral efficient utilization is by organizing the areas. ITU-R Recommendation 
SM.1046-1 mentions a definition of Spectrum efficiency (SUE) of a radio communication 
system by [10]:  
 
SU E= M ÷ U = M ÷ (B . S . T)                                                                                  (2.2)  
                                            Where, M: amount of information transferred over a distance. 
    According to the area classification that is mentioned in section 2.2 above, the 
traffic distribution will be uneven as well. Therefore it is required to make an 
organization to the area of utilization in order to calculate the spectral efficiency that 
is defined in equation 2.2 as it needs to calculate U in each sub-area which it equals to 
the product of frequency bandwidth, the geometric space (area), and time.  
    However, there is requirement of founding and developing computational model 
for SUE which may be tuned for specific city or group of cities and it should meet 
computations requirements such as flexibility and capability to create rules; ability to 
deal time to time and geographical differences; finding the best possible utilization 
depending on traffic pattern; ability to evaluate efficiency in a network with multi 
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types of technology; considering the gain which may be achieved by using new 
techniques such as smart antenna and network synchronization or another technique 
available at defined point in time.  
     Computational model may be used and developed for assessing spectral utilization 
called Computational Model for Spectral Efficiency with abbreviated name 
COMSUE. The model helps in finding the geographical variations influence on the 
spectrum utilizations in addition to other factors such as time, type of technology and 
technique used in the measurements. [10]  
 
2.2.2.2 Using OFDM Technique 
 
    Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) concept was born in the 
mid-1960s as a multi-carrier transmission technique. Recent researches in frequency 
field found and adopted the OFDM as "an effective technique for high-speed 
bidirectional wireless data transfer". It can be used in WiMax, DAB, DVB-T because 
it has particular features such as [12]: 
1- OFDM is not affected by channel defects. 
2- At a particular rate of transition, OFDM as a comparison with traditional 
modulation scheme can transmit with lesser bandwidth. Therefore, it is 
considered as a technique that uses spectrum frequency very efficiently. 
 
2.2.2.3 Using Mobile WiMax rather than GSM/EDGE 
 
       A comparison made in [13] concluded that between Mobile WiMax and 
GSM/EDGE, it is found that around 20% to 40% higher spectrum efficiency can be 
offered if we use Mobile WiMax instead of the established GSM/EDGE technology 
according to the traffic model has been assumed in this comparison. 
 
2.2.2.4 Using digital cellular channels  
 
      In [14], the author found as a result of his comparison between digital cellular and 
analog cellular channels that higher spectral efficiency can be obtained if he use 
digital cellular channels rather than the latter. The parameter of measuring spectrum 
efficiency used here is called radio capacity. It is proved that splitting analog channels 
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did not increase the spectrum efficiency in cellular radio systems, while it (i.e. 
spectrum efficiency) increased using digital cellular channels.  
 
 2.2.2.5 Sectorization 
 
     Sectorization distributes channel resource more thinly among the different sectors. 
This will reduce, for a given cellular cluster size, co channel interference and increase 
the Signal to Interference ratio (S/I ratio). If the cluster size remains constant, 
spectrum efficiency of a sectorized system will be reduced. [11]  
     In [15] it has been adopted a definition of spectrum efficiency by expressing it in 
terms of area, bandwidth, and Erlang.  
  
Spectrum Efficiency = Erlang / (BW x area)                       (2.3)  
Erlang is: the total amount of traffic carried in the cellular system. 
 
     Cluster size can be reduced since lower co channel interference found in case of 
sectorized cellular system, and, accordingly increasing the spectrum efficiency of the 
overall system as shown in figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3: Spectrum Efficiency versus cell radius for different cellular configurations [11] 
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      In [11] also it was shown that "higher spectrum efficiency is achieved by reducing 
the cluster size in a sectorized system without lowering the S/I ratio below 17 dB".  
 
2.2.2.6 Cognitive Technique 
    Cognitive technique is a recent research topic used to increase spectral efficiency.  
 
2.3 Cognitive Radio & Cognitive Network  
     Cognitive Radio (CR) technology, defined first in 2000[16], and then it had been 
advocated by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to be   considered as the 
best technique for implementing opportunistic spectrum sharing. 
    A Cognitive Radio can be defined as it is “a radio that can change its transmitter 
parameters based on interaction with the environment in which it operates” [17]. 
Sometimes secondary user is called a cognitive user as it (i.e. cognitive radio) is the 
technique that enable secondary user to use or share the spectrum opportunistically. 
 
   The differences between the cognitive radio and cognitive network are: 
 
1. The goals of each one, the goals of the cognitive network are how to modify 
the performances of end-to-end network; but the cognitive radio goals are 
focused on the radio's users only. 
2. The types of communication systems, cognitive network can deal with both 
wired and wireless networks which means that it is useful with heterogeneous 
types of network; but cognitive radio can be used only in wireless systems. 
3. SDR (Software-Defined Radio) provides cognitive radio with tunable 
parameters which is useful to know the optimization space of the cognitive 
process; and SAN (Software Adaptable Network) is used with cognitive 
network to allow cognitive process to adapt the network. 
 
     In [2] the author concludes that "cognitive radio technology is a way in which one 
radio or even a network of radios is able to learn a useful degree of adaptively that 
aids the user, the network, and/or the spectrum owner". And he viewed the findings 
of the previous researchers, such as: 
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    Rondeau and Bostian have proved that a radio can learn proper adoptions 
successfully to a spectral environment that optimize for objective metrics by studying 
the use of Genetic Algorithm (GA) used to learn in given a set of objective metrics 
how a radio could best respond to a spectral environment.[2] 
     A radio has to recognize the locations and conditions visually, owner's voice and 
visual characteristics; should have the ability to take verbal commands. That’s all 
what Mitalo had proposed.  
    Game theory has been studied by Neel and Reed to apply it to a radio as a member 
of a cognitive network. They were able to analyze protocols to prove that with game 
theory cognitive radio behavior could result in stable network behavior. [2] 
 
     These researches will develop the market, if we could consider it as an 
economically successful business, new products and services will be found before 
general cognition is applied in practice on a radio.  
 
       2.3.1 Cognitive Networks 
 
     Cognitive networks as it is described in [2] "has a cognitive process that can 
perceive current network conditions, and then plan, decide and act on those 
conditions. The network can learn from these adaptations and use them to make 
future decisions, all while taking into account end-to-end goals" .As we mentioned, 
cognitive system is said to be a cognitive radio or layer except if it works with a 
network and end-to-end scope.  
     End-to-end means all the elements may be found in networks that have a 
contribution in the process of transmission of a data flow. The network probably 
includes the subnets, routers, switches, virtual connections, encryption schemes, 
mediums, interfaces, or waveforms, to mention just a few. Software Adaptable 
Network (SAN) must be fed with elements to modify. These elements are supplied by 
cognitive network since SAN depends on network which has tenable element, like 
SDR in cognitive radio, which depends on elements of radio operation such as time, 
frequency, bandwidth, code, spatiality, or waveform to be modified.  
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2.3.1.1 Advantages, Limitations, Cost  
 
Advantages: 
The cognitive network can be used to improve the end-to-end performance and its 
objectives as resource management, quality of service (QoS), security, access control, 
or throughput.  
Limitations: 
The cognitive networks have limitation in adaptability of the network elements which 
are hidden or underlying and flexibility of cognitive process. 
Costs: 
The cost of the network in terms of communications and processing, architecture roll-
out and maintenance must be less important in comparison with the advantage of 
using the cognitive network to improve the performance. Therefore cognitive is not 
suitable for networks like fixed or static wired networks that have expected behaviour 
while the ideal candidates for cognitive are heterogeneous wireless networks. [2] 
 
2.3.3 Cognitive Radio  
 
     Recent rule of CR spectrum management considered all new spectrum users as 
secondary (cognitive) users and they can work in a condition that  they must detect and 
avoid the primary users (Primary user means the user that has the priority to use a specific 
part of spectrum because it uses the band by license). 
    A new technology becomes easily to implement because of unlicensed band which 
gives it (i.e. new technology) chance to arise. But it faces a problem since there are other 
bands that used by other technology and the spectrum bands are usually licensed to 
certain services, such as mobile, fixed, broadcast, and satellite, to prevent harmful 
interference among different networks [18]. The new technology must avoid interference 
with them. Therefore, it couldn’t use the unlicensed band with its full capabilities but it is 
recognized that licensed bands are used partially (i.e. not full utilization). However, 
cognitive radio devices are used to improve the efficiency of Spectrum-Utilization. The 
main functions of CR devices are:  
 Sensing the environment. 
 Detecting the unused channels or portions in the licensed band. 
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 Access these portions opportunistically.  
 
The main component of CR concept is the ability to sense, measure, learn, and be 
aware of: 
    1- Parameters related to the radio channel characteristics;  
    2- Availability of spectrum and power; 
    3- Interference and Noise temperature; 
    4- Radio’s operating environment; 
    5- User requirements and applications; 
    6- Available networks (Infrastructures) and nodes; 
    7- Local policies and other operating restrictions.   
 
Example: 
   We have licensed band as a primary network or user and unlicensed band, 
represents a secondary network or user. If the primary network leaves some holes (see 
figure 2.4) in its band because it does not always use its designated channel, the entire 
spectrum has spaces can be utilized as a spectral opportunity between t2 & t3 to be 
accessed by a secondary network.  
 
                                             t1               t2              t3            t4 
Time 
 
Figure 2.4: The blank spots represent holes and each hole then referred to as spectral 
opportunity [2] 
 
    To achieve the goal of Cognitive Radio it requires development of a new 
hardware/software and changing the current spectrum allocation policies. SDR 
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(Software Defined Radio) is used to develop radio interfaces in a flexible and 
powerful ways for providing spectral agility. 
     The research in this issue – spectral efficiency – increased in recent years and the 
researchers need to answer the following questions: 
 
1- To what extent the improvement can be done? 
2- How sparsely-used spectrum bands can be discovered and identified by individual 
devices? 
3- How these spectrum bands to be prioritized or characterized? 
4- How and when spectrum bands should be utilized? 
 
2.3.4 Cognitive Cycle 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Basic Cognitive Cycle [2] 
 
The cognitive cycle includes three major components shown in figure 2.5 and as 
follows [2]: 
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1. RF sensing: 
    This task deals with prediction and spectrum sensing, hence, it places on physical 
layer issues. The main functions of this task are detecting spaces or holes may be 
found in spectrum (or unused bands), estimating state information of the channel such 
as Signal to Noise ratio, total interference estimation (in the radio environment), and 
channel capacity prediction for use by the transmitter. 
 
2. Cognition/management: 
     Cognition and management task deals with issues of controlling the opportunistic 
spectrum access by spectrum management, traffic shaping, routing, and provisioning 
of Quality of Service (QoS). 
 
3. Control actions: 
     The main functions of this task of cognitive cycle are controlling of transmission 
rate, adaptive coding and modulation, and controlling of the transmit-power. 
 
2.4 Summary 
      There are methods for operations to each task that are mentioned in this chapter. 
For example one of the methods for task 2 (i.e. cognition/management) is Game 
Theory approach as the method that has been proposed in [19] in which the author has 
proposed a method of optimum spectrum allocation in cognitive radio using game 
theory. There are also large number of papers and researches that has been published 
about the task 1 (i.e. RF sensing).  
     In this thesis we will focus on the cognition/management in particular on the use of 
game theory applications approach within their mechanism.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Spectrum Sensing  
 
3.1 Sensing and Efficient Spectrum Utilization 
 
          The spectrum as it is allocated to the users by licenses and then these users 
have the highest priority to use the licensed frequency bands. Therefore, licensed 
users called primary users that have the right in utilize the spectrum. The spectrum 
became scarce and demands increased on the frequency as resource of services 
implemented by new users. On the other hand the primary users (PU) do not utilize 
their bands full utilization (i.e. there are spaces or holes in the licensed bands). So 
that, new users were allowed to use the holes found in allocated frequency but with 
lower priority as they considered secondary users (SU).  However, interference is 
another issue faced SU because the PU is not responsible on offering frequency to 
the SU if it harms PU's subscribers. Therefore, it becomes the duty of SU to exploit 
the holes in PU's bands in a condition prevent PU from interference. This can be 
done by using the capabilities offered by cognitive radio which one of them is 
sensing, this is the most important task need for efficient spectral utilization.   
 
      Spectrum Sensing can be identified as method of measuring: [2] 
1- The spectral content 
2- The interference  
3- Primary users existence detection 
4- Noise 
5- Spectral holes  
    
      All above measurements serves SU responsibility in exploiting the licensed band; 
so that, SU called sometimes as cognitive user. The characteristics of spectrum using 
by cognitive radio technique obtained across multiple dimensions which are time, 
frequency and space. Type of signals, which occupying the spectrum such as 
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(modulation, waveform, bandwidth, carrier frequency, etc.) can be also determined by 
cognitive technique. Following are multi-dimensional radio spectrum spaces can be 
utilized in a way of opportunity [2]:   
 
3.2 Sensing Dimensions 
 
       The ways of exploiting and measuring the spectrum space or holes are 
defined by the definition of spectrum opportunity which is often referred as “band 
of frequencies that are not being used by the primary user of that band at a 
particular time in a particular geographic area” [20]. The conventional 
opportunity exploits only three dimensions of the spectrum space: time, 
frequency, and space. However, other dimensions need to be explored such as the 
code dimension, angle dimension, and signal dimension of the spectrum space. 
Naturally, new challenges for detection of this new opportunity will be brought 
about.  
 
1- Frequency 
    Spectrum opportunity in this dimension comes from the band situation when 
not all the bands are used at the same time simultaneously, i.e. availability in the 
part of frequency as illustrated in figure 3.1 below. Then we can get opportunistic 
usage from some available bands; in other words, opportunity in the frequency 
domain. 
Figure 3.1: Opportunity in both frequency and time dimensions [2] 
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2- Time 
      This domain is time corresponding when there is a specific part of the 
spectrum available in time, i.e. the band isn't used continuously and all the time. 
That means there are times for this part of spectrum to be available can be utilized   
in opportunistic usage, also shown clearly in figure 3.1. [2] 
 
3- Geographic space 
      At a given time the spectrum may be occupied in some parts of the 
geographical area while it is available in other area parts. Propagation loss (path 
loss) in space is the issue of this dimension it can take advantage from this loss.  
The measurements depend on interference temperature i.e. we can determine the 
existence of a primary transmission in a local area from situation of interference 
existence in that area. But there is a problem of hidden terminals arises here that 
required a careful determination and decision. [2]         
    Figure 3.2 shows two areas A and B, the opportunity can be found in region A 
where it is assumed that no existence of a primary transmission in this area.  
 
Figure 3.2: Geographic Dimension of Spectrum opportunity [2] 
 
4- Code Dimension 
   It determines the used codes and multipath parameter. At a given time the 
spectrum over a wideband is used through spread spectrum. In spite of that, there 
is availability over this band. Without interfering with primary users, simultaneous 
 Spectrum Utilization Using Game Theory    
 26 
 
transmission could be done in code domain with the orthogonal code with respect 
to codes used by primary users.  
 
Figure 3.3: Code Dimension Sensing [2] 
 
   This offers opportunity in code domain not only detecting the spectrum usage. 
Then sensing is required in [2]: 
 
 Spreading code 
 Time hopping (TH) 
 Frequency hopping (FH) sequences those used by primary users. 
 The timing information to enable secondary users to synchronize their 
transmissions with respect to primary users. 
 
    The relation between code dimension and frequency with time is shown in 
figure 3.3 
 
5- Angle Dimension 
     If it is assumed that the primary users and/or the secondary users transmit 
in all the directions, then spectrum opportunities in angle dimension can be 
done by the help of the knowledge of the location/ position or direction of 
primary users. That mean the secondary user can transmit in a direction differs 
from the direction of the primary user transition in a condition avoiding 
interference with primary user [2]. 
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      Then it needs to detect the locations of primary users and its beam directions   
(azimuth and elevation angle) as illustrated in figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4:  Angle Dimension Sensing [2] 
 
6- Signal Dimension 
  If both the primary and the secondary users transmit a waveform in such a way 
that no opportunity can be found in all the above dimensions i.e. they transmit at a 
specific band for a given time in a geographical area in all the directions. Even 
when that case happens exploitation can be done in the signal dimension by 
transmitting an orthogonal waveform that does not create interference with 
primary users. This requires waveform identification in addition to spectrum 
estimation, and signal polarization to be sensed. [2] 
 
Figure 3.5: Wave Dimension Sensing [2] 
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3.3 Spectrum Sensing Aspects  
 
     There are several methods used in spectrum sensing for cognitive radio and 
various aspects of spectrum sensing [2] would be briefly explained as follows. 
 
 Matched Filtering 
 Energy detector 
 Spectral Correlation (Cyclostationarity) 
 Wavelet Based Sensing 
 Waveform Based Sensing 
 Cooperative Sensing 
o Centralized 
o Distributed  
 
3.3.1 Matched Filtering: 
 
     It is used to detect primary users with a known transmitted signal .It’s main 
advantage that considered as a feature in comparison with other methods is in 
achieving certain probability of false alarm or miss detection in short time [2]. 
Matched filtering has also an important property that it increases output signal to 
noise ratio when there is a signal corrupted by white Gaussian noise (AWGN) [18].  
    Then it is required from cognitive radio to demodulate the received signals. Perfect 
information about features of primary user signal is need such as modulation type, 
bandwidth, operating frequency, etc.   
 
Drawbacks in this Method: 
1- Complex implementation because for all signal types, cognitive radio needs 
receivers 
2- It needs to execute various receiver algorithms for detection; hence it works 
with large power consumption [2].  
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3.3.2 Energy Detector:- 
     The opposite of filtering method is the energy detection method where the 
secondary user cannot get perfect knowledge about the primary user's features, then 
the energy detection considered as an optimal detector. It is known as radiometry that 
measures the received waveform energy to detect unknown signals.  
     Simply we can implement the method by a block diagram shown in figure 3.6 [18]  
 
 
    Input y(t)                                                                                                   Output V 
 
Figure 3.6: Energy detection [18] 
 
   The purpose of the bandpass filter (BPF) in the beginning of the process is to select 
the desired bandwidth and limiting the noise. The energy detector is represented by 
two components; a squaring device and a finite time integrator. The output signal V 
from the integrator is[18]: 
 
                   (3.1) 
 
 
     The signal is detected by comparing the output of energy detector with a threshold, 
which depends on the noise floor. It is preferred because it is simple in 
implementation and computation and does not need knowledge on the primary users’ 
signal. 
 
3.3.3 Cyclostationarity-Based Sensing  
 
       If there is a signal having statistical properties and can vary cyclically with time, 
then this process called cyclostationary. Cyclostationary processes treated with two 
different approaches the probabilistic approach and deterministic approach [21]. In 
sensing task of cognitive radio cyclostationarity feature detection is used as a method 
has a capability of detecting primary user transmissions because it can exploit the 
cyclostationarity features of the received signals. Signal periodicity or the statistics 
like mean and autocorrelation causes Cyclostationary features [2]. Many advantages 
 
BPF 
 
 
 
|.|
2
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offered by cyclostationary features in comparing with the stationary models. In [22] a 
signal detector is presented that exploits spectral correlation. Its goal is determining 
the presence or absence of a cyclostationary signal in noise. Therefore the 
cyclostationarity-based detection algorithms are used to differentiate noise from 
primary users’ signals [2]. 
 
3.3.4 Cooperative Sensing 
 
    Spectrum sensing process including many problems can be solved by cooperative 
sensing such as: 
 
 Solving problems due to fading, noise uncertainty and shadowing. 
 Decreasing probability of miss-detections. 
 Decreasing probability of false alarms. 
 Decreasing sensing time. 
 Solving hidden primary user problem.  
 
      Only one cognitive radio can estimate traffic in a specific geographic area locally, 
or it can be combined information from various cognitive radio. In fact, the 
performance would be degraded when the cognitive radio has no knowledge about the 
primary user's location; "the challenges of cooperative sensing include developing 
efficient information sharing algorithms and increased complexity"[2]. The researcher 
in [22] modeled a simple Listen-Before-Talk (LBT) scheme and investigated his 
mechanism via analysis and computer simulation. He discussed the problem of 
interference to primary users caused by cognitive radio devices using spectrum access 
mechanisms based on simple LBT scheme. The results proved that unutilized 
spectrum can be explored using simple local sensing without causing interference to 
existing users. While the analytical and numerical results show that spectrum capacity 
gains provided by collaborative sensing is higher than that provided by local sensing. 
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3.3.4.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of local and cooperative (or collaborative) 
sensing methods [2]: 
 
 Cooperative (Collaborative) 
      Higher accuracy; reduced sensing time and it can prevent shadowing effect and 
hidden node problems. While it has disadvantages in:  
Complexity of sensor, within-system cooperation and among-system cooperation; 
traffic overhead and requirement of control channel. 
 
 Local (Non-Cooperative) 
         It is Simple in Computation and implementation. While it has disadvantages in: 
inability to solve hidden node problem, multipath and shadowing.  
      The control channel in cooperative sensing architectures can be implemented by 
different methodologies. One of these methods can be selected according to the 
system requirements. These include a dedicated band, unlicensed band, and underlay 
Ultra Wideband (UWB) system. 
 
3.3.4.2 Cooperative Sensing Fashions 
Two fashions: centralized or distributed can be used to implement cooperative sensing 
as follows [2]: 
 
Centralized Sensing 
     Centralized sensing consists of central unit using cognitive devices and collects the 
sensing information from it. The collected information used to identify the available 
frequency, then controls the cognitive radio traffic directly or broadcasts this 
information to other cognitive radios. Some researchers' results discussed in [2] as 
follows: 
 Access Point (AP) represents the name of a central place where the hard 
(binary) sensing results are gathered. It is a method to reduce the fading effects 
of the channel and increase performance of detection. 
 Another research worked on the above one for its sensing algorithm. Resulting 
detection and false alarm rates are given here. 
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 For detecting TV channels the sensing results are combined in a master node 
as a central node. To reduce the probability of missed opportunity, hard and 
soft information combining methods are investigated here.  
 The results of other research show in terms of the probability of missed 
opportunity that soft information-combining surpasses hard information-
combining method. 
 
Distributed Sensing 
        Cognitive nodes in case of distributed sensing can share information among each 
other but they have their own decisions about the part of the spectrum they can use. It 
is no requirement for a backbone infrastructure; therefore it considered more 
advantageous.  
 
3.4 Spectrum Sensing Methods 
        Following are some previous researches on the sensing methods mentioned 
above: 
 
3.4.1 Energy Detection Methods 
 
3.4.1.1 Multimode Spectrum Sensing Based on Energy Detection for Dynamic 
Spectrum Access 
 
      Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) is a spectrum sharing between licensed primary 
users (PUs) and unlicensed secondary users (SUs) in a way that unlicensed SUs are 
allowed to access the spectrum in a condition they do not make interference with the 
PU. Figure 3.7(a) illustrates the geographical overview of a DSA Network (DSAN) to 
share the spectrum with a PU. The DSAN, including several SUs, is located where the 
distance between it and the primary transmitter (PT) is d. A region of decodability 
around the PT is limited with a radius of rdec. Decodability region is the region in 
which PU receiver can only decode the signal if it is inside this region in the absence 
of interference and fading. The secondary users region which they are clustered in is 
with radius rs termed as DSAN. Since all the SUs are located in the region of 
decodability, then they can use the spectrum only when the PT does not transmit. 
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       Two techniques "for weighted combining of the channel sensing results of users: 
weighted gain combining and log-likelihood combining" [23]. The power of receiving 
signal which received by SUs from PU is different on average from some SUs to 
others because of shadowing, or slow fading. The average power of the signal at a 
secondary node can be estimated since shadowing changes slowly over time. 
 
 
Figure 3.7: System model: (a) Geographical overview of the considered network, 
            (b) Parallel cooperative detection topology with fusion centre [23] 
  
    Both techniques exploit the information that is direct measure for the node quality 
of detection in order to weight the information of the SUs to be able to enhance the 
detection quality. 
    The secondary users have to cooperate in sensing the channel state because in case 
of sever shadowing plus detection of Rayleigh fading single node is not reliable 
sufficiently for DSA. This technique of weighting which exploits the knowledge of 
the local mean SNR results in a great improvement compared to other techniques 
which do not use this information. Log-likelihood combining surpasses all the other 
techniques in the case of low number of nodes in the network and low SNR. A 
parallel network as shown in figure 3.7(b) represents the detection topology used for 
cooperative detection with a fusion center. It consists of more than one detector to 
observe the same phenomenon. The fusion center which is one of the nodes dedicated 
in the DSAN, receives the measurement statistics from the local detectors. [23]  
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3.4.1.2 Other Energy Detection Methods 
    Many researches have done depending on the energy detector-base sensing with 
different calculations and results as follows [2]: 
 
1- In [24, 25] used energy detector to analyze and identify the idle and busy 
periods of WLAN channels. 
 
2- The sensing in [26] has special case that is the cognitive radio has to be 
synchronized to the primary user network and the time of sensing is limited to 
slot duration. In this work a comparison is made for identifying the idle slots 
for exploitation by measuring energy level for each Global System for Mobile 
(GSM) slot.  
 
3- Unused cellular slots are opportunistically exploited in [27] by approach 
similar to [26].  
 
4- In [28], in order to identify the number of used TV channels a threshold is 
used to be compared with power at the output of Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) 
of incoming.  
 
5- In [29], it is investigated the performance of energy detector-based sensing 
over various fading channels. Fading channels and closed-form expressions 
for detection probability under AWGN are derived.  
 
6- The performance of energy-detector is observed to be degraded considerably 
under Rayleigh fading in [30].  Average probability of detection is also 
derived for energy detector-based sensing algorithms under Rayleigh fading 
channels and log-normal shadowing. 
 
7- For unknown noise power scenarios it is suitable to use forward methods 
based on energy measurements as in [31]. It is suitable practically for cases 
where noise variance is not known because the proposed method estimates the 
noise level adaptively.  
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3.4.2 Cooperative Sensing Methods 
      Following are two methods for spectrum sensing using cooperative sensing 
method to scan the environment and detect the spaces in the spectrum that can be 
utilized opportunistically: 
 
3.4.2.1 Cooperative Spectrum Sensing and Detection for Cognitive Radio 
 
    Suboptimal fusion rule is the basic notion of this method that handles correlation 
issues and it is not dependent on the model or on exact knowledge of the statistics of 
the signal.  
      The goal is to detect times when a specific licensed band at a particular place is 
unused and use the band for transmission avoiding any significant interference to the 
transmissions of the primary user (license-holder). The author considers the problems 
that face the secondary user (cognitive user) in order to design practical solutions to 
the detection problem which are: 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Guard band. The interior of the primary’s range and the guard band together form 
the protected region. [32] 
 
1- The SNR of the primary user's signal received by the secondary users 
may be very small. Then secondary users must be sure that they avoid 
interference even at the edge of the primary’s coverage area as shown 
in Figure 3.8. The location of secondary users assumed to be within the 
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primary’s range or around it in the guard band this make a risk of 
potentially interference with the primary’s transmissions.  
2- The transmission scheme used by the primary users is not known by 
the secondary users and may be not synchronized to the primary’s 
signal then secondary users use non-coherent feature detectors or 
energy detectors. That means poorer performances under low SNR.  
3- Shadowing which causes in the hidden-terminal problem. Some 
secondary users may be located in such a way that is shadowed away 
from the primary’s transmitter while there may be found secondary 
users that close to primary receivers that are not shadowed from the 
primary transmitter. Hence, it may be interference between the primary 
receiver’s reception and the secondary when it transmits.[32]  
 
3.4.2.2 Cooperative Spectrum Sensing Using Random Matrix Theory 
 
     This method introduced a new cooperative scheme for frequency band sensing for 
both AWGN and fading channels, uses asymptotic random matrix theory tools. The 
new scheme is related to the behavior of the largest and smallest random matrices' 
eigenvalue. The knowledge of the noise statistics is not required nor its variance. 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Considered scenarios for spectrum sensing. [33] 
 
    Figure 3.9 illustrates the scenario used in this method where the primary users 
(white figures) communicate to their dedicated (primary) base station. Cooperatively, 
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secondary base stations {BS1, BS2, BS3, ... , BSK} are sensing the channel in order to 
detect and identify a space found in the medium to be exploited. 
    The author concludes the comparison between the performance of new cooperative 
spectrum sensing using random matrix theory technique and the cooperative energy 
detector scheme for both a known and unknown noise variance. The new one is quite 
robust and does not need any information of the signal or noise statistics. [33] 
 
3.4.3 Distributed Sensing Methods 
3.4.3.1 Distributed Spectrum Sensing for Cognitive Radio Systems 
   This method has the ability to modify the spectral estimation reliability and decrease 
the probability of interference between cognitive radios (secondary users) and the 
primary users (i.e. existing systems). The joint work of cognitive radio is the base of 
determining the spectrum occupancy instead of individually determination of each 
cognitive radio.  
     The block diagram of this method is shown in figure 3.10 as a parallel fusion 
network. Cyclic feature-based method for distributed signal detection and 
classification is proposed in this work. This technique is an approach for the unknown 
signal detection problem instead as opposed to using radiometer, which is "highly 
susceptible to unknown and changing noise levels and interference" [34]. There are 
important advantages of cyclic feature-based technique such as capabilities of signal 
classification and minimizing sensitivity to unknown and changing background noise, 
exploiting timing or phase properties of signal that is digitally modulated. IEEE 
802.22 work group have a great deal of attention of such techniques.  
  
Figure 3.10: Block diagram of a parallel fusion network. [34] 
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     Figure 3.11 shows that the probability of detection increases from approximately 
30% to 60%, for a probability of false alarm equal to 10% if 10 sensors are used 
instead of using a single sensor to perform signal detection. The results also show that 
the use of cyclic feature-based methods for signal detection and classification 
provides reliable detection/classification even at low signal-to-noise ratio scenarios. 
[34] 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Distributed detection of a known signal in AWGN using single-cycle detectors 
[34] 
 
3.4.3.2 Other Distributed Sensing Methods 
 
Following are other researches about distributed sensing [2]:  
 GUESS (Gossiping Updates for Efficient Spectrum Sensing) is proposed 
which is an incremental gossiping approach to perform efficient coordination 
between cognitive radios in the distributed collaborative sensing. The 
proposed algorithm has low-complexity with reduced protocol overhead and 
has robust to network changes and fast convergence as it does not require a 
setup phase to generate the clusters. Incremental aggregation and randomized 
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gossiping algorithms are used in the same research for efficient coordination 
within a cognitive radio network. 
 Another distributed collaboration algorithm is proposed that perform the 
collaboration between two secondary users in different locations. One of the 
users is located closer to primary transmitter, so it has a better chance of 
detecting the primary user transmission, cooperates with the second user 
which is far away. Also proposed algorithm for pairing secondary users 
without a centralized mechanism.  
 Multi-Secondary users can share their sensing information among themselves 
by distributed sensing method. As a way of minimizing the network overhead 
due to collaboration, only final decisions are shared. Each secondary user 
receives decisions from other users then makes a decision according to others' 
decision. If any of the received decisions plus its own is H1, it would decide 
H1, a fusion rule known as OR-rule. This research results show the 
improvements of performance that achieved through collaborative sensing. 
 
3.5 Urgent Case 
 
      Secondary user has to quickly vacate the licensed frequency band in urgent case if 
the primary user wants to use this portion of the band. 
 
     In [35] has been discussed a method of distribution change in frequency domain to 
empty licensed frequency band from secondary radio networks occupation. At the 
beginning the cognitive user has to sense and detect the change of spectrum activity 
i.e. the change in primary user action at urgent case. Therefore, the theory of quickest 
detection can be applied to detect the distribution change in observations as quickly as 
possible. The problem of unknown parameters of primary radio signal is solved by a 
successive refinement based quickest detection. The author here mentioned that this 
work is applicable to the single SU only and he was studying the problem of multi-
user for the future work.   
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3.6 Summary 
 
      This chapter has been devoted to identify the sensing task and works of previous 
researchers as an introduction to our work that assumes to use one of the sensing 
methods. We need to scan the environment by sensing technique to detect 
dynamically the holes may be found in the allocated band of the PU to be efficiently 
utilized from the group of the SUs. Chapter 6 in this thesis will clarify the relation 
between sensing technique and the method of 'Spectrum Utilization Using Game 
Theory' that has been proposed in this work.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Game Theory in Wireless Network 
 
4.1 Introduction 
    In general Game theory is a study of how can we choose a rational choice if it (i.e. 
our choice) affects others and others choices affect us by providing a mathematical 
analysis of interacting decision-making processes and tools for predicting what might 
happen if there is conflict in interests among agents. It has the ability to give the way 
of how players make rational decisions even when they are interdependent and model 
decision maker with actions affect other decision makers independently [36]. 
     Primarily, Game theory has been applied in economics as a method to model 
competition among sellers or companies: for example, if a company plans to enter 
new market, it should consider its competitors' actions in this field which they could 
make similar (or different) decision. Game theory has also been used to other fields, 
like politics and biology so recently; it has been applied to communications and 
networking to their problems in routing and resource allocation [37]. This ability 
attracts ad hoc network researchers to use game theory as a method of analyzing ad 
hoc performances [36]. 
       
4.2 Classifications of Game Theory 
    There are many types of games and they can be classified as shown in table 4.1 
[38]:  
Cooperative Non-cooperative 
Static Dynamic (repeated) 
Strategic-form Extensive-form 
Perfect information Imperfect information 
complete information incomplete information 
 
Table 4.1: Game's classifications1 [38] 
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       There are further classifications as in the table 4.2 [38] 
 
 
Zero – sum Non Zero – sum 
Simultaneous Sequential 
Symmetric Asymmetric 
Dominant Undominant 
 
Table 4.2: Game's classifications2  
                         
     Each type has a specific use depending on the application which used. However 
any game is composed of three basic components: a set of players (i = {1, 2, 3, 
…,N}), a set of possible actions (Ai) for each player and a set of utility function 
mapping action profiles into the real numbers (Ui).     
 
4.3 Game's Concepts 
     It is a game because each player strives to get maximum payoff in a competition 
with other player therefore it is necessary to have a mechanism to prevent any single 
player from individually improving her payoff by deviating, that is called 'Nash 
Equilibrium'. It sometimes be unique and other times is multiple (e.g. in coordination 
games). From all of above we must be able to define the game and its setting, also 
have to answer these questions [36]: 
 
1- Who are the players of the game? 
2- What are the actions for these players? 
3- What objectives each player has? 
4- Equilibrium existence for the game. If it exists, is it unique? 
5- Do players update their strategies by a dynamic process if it exists? 
6- If the answer of question 5 is 'yes', what is that dynamic process? 
 
4.3.1 Extensive Form 
         Extensive form or sometimes called tree form describes how the game is played 
over time with some important roles. Direct analysis may be done in extensive form, 
or by converting into an equivalent strategic form [39] as shown in figure 4.1. Each 
node here is a player which is specified by a number on the node. Actions of players 
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are represented by the lines between nodes. The numbers at the end of the tree 
represent players' payoffs [21]. 
 
Figure 4.1: Extensive (tree) form [21] 
        
     If Player 1 moves first and chooses A, Player 2 sees Player 1's choice and then 
chooses C or D. If Player 2 chooses C, then Player 1 has payoff 10 and Player 2 has 
payoff 6. 
 
4.3.2 Strategic Form 
       The strategic form is also called normal form. In a strategic form we can see 
players, each player’s actions which also called strategies that can be taken from 
players and payoff for each player all are represented in a table or matrix as in figure 
2.4. 
4,1210,10
6,612,4
Action1
   Action2
Action1 Action2
P2
P1
PLAYERS
STRATEGY
PAYOFFS
 
Figure 4.2: Strategic (Normal) Forms 
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    Figure 4.2 shows an example of two players' game; one chooses the row (P1) and 
the other chooses the column (P2). Each player acts into two strategies (Action 1, 
Action 2).The first number in each cell in the matrix represents the payoff for player 
in the row (i.e. P1); the column player (P2) has payoff which represented by second 
number in each cell. For this example when P1 acts strategy of Action 1 and P2 acts 
Action 2, then the payoff for P1 equals "4" while for P2 is "12".  
     If the actions are known to all players, in general the game is presented in tree 
form. When each player has no information about actions of the others, the game is 
usually presented in strategic form [21]. 
4.3.3 Nash Equilibrium 
 
       Nash equilibrium is a set of actions (strategies), where no player gains by 
unilaterally change her action. Any change in strategies of any player under 
equilibrium, would cause that player to gain less than if she still acts her current 
strategy. In such condition we can say players are in equilibrium. "For games in 
which players randomize (mixed strategies), the expected or average payoff must be 
at least as large as that obtainable by any other strategy" [38].  
     Consider the following example [40] of market the notion is how competitive 
prices increase the profit of sellers. In other words, we have two sellers (A and B) 
they sell "widgets" at different prices (one, two, or three) as in table 4.3.    
  
  Seller B 
  p=1 p=2 P=3 
Seller A 
p=1 0,0 50, -10 40,-20 
p=2 -10,50 20,20 90,10 
p=3 -20, 40 10,90 50,50 
                                          
Table 4.3: selling strategy form [40] 
 
     The competition here is on how many widgets each seller would sell if he reduces 
the price of selling because he would increase his customers. That means the payoff is 
profit; the players are Seller A and Seller B; the strategies are p=1, p=2 and p=3. The 
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values of profits in the table are assumption depending on strategies of the two 
competitors.  
     The purpose of this example is to find Nash equilibrium. We can see the strategy 
pairs and check if they can be considered as Nash equilibrium or not. At the beginning 
we check strategy pair (p=3, p=3) which has utility of (50, 50). If Seller B cut his 
price, then the utility is either (10, 90) or (-20, 40), (i.e. his payoff in both pairs 
increased). If Seller A cut his price, then the utility is either (90, 10) or (40, -20) also 
his payoff in both pairs increased. Therefore, (50, 50) is not Nash equilibrium. We can 
then check strategy pair (p=3, p=2) which has utility of (10, 90) when Seller A sells at 
price 3 and Seller B sells at price 2. Seller A gets benefit if he cuts his price to 1, 
where the utility is either (50, -10) also it is not Nash equilibrium.  
     Finally, consider the upper left strategy pair (0, 0). Each seller can't get any benefit 
from increasing his price (i.e. changing his strategy with remaining the other's 
strategy constant), that means (0, 0) is Nash equilibrium of this game. 
 
4.4 Examples of Games 
4.4.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma  
       It is an example of simultaneous games with two players formed in strategic form 
as shown in figure 4.3 [39].    
              
                    3
     0
                
                    2
     2
                     1
      1
                     0
      3
CI
DI
CII DII
II
I
 
Figure 4.3: Prisoner Dilemma [39] 
      It is a story of two suspects arrested for serious offense without evidence of 
conviction. Crime investigators have no way except acknowledgement of one of the 
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prisoners against the other. Each prisoner has one of the choices illustrated in table 4.4 
which affected by the other prisoner's action [39]:   
Table 4.4: prisoner's choices 
     Figure 4.3 shows the strategic form of the players actions, the players here are the 
prisoners called for simplification I and II, whereas the strategies are (CI = player I 
cooperate, DI= player I defect, CII=player II cooperate, and DII=player II defect). I 
chooses one of the rows (CI or DI), while II chooses columns either CII or DII. Their 
choices are simultaneously taken so that it is simultaneous game and couldn't be 
formed in extensive form. It is clear each cell represents the payoff pair for each 
player according to her (his) choice which is written as combination (e.g. (CI, DII) 
means player I chose CI, player II chose DII, then the payoff for I = 0 and for II = 3 
and so on).  
     Another property can be found in this example that is the symmetric between the 
players. If the players are exchange between them and the game remains the same, 
then this game called symmetric game as this example and shown more clear in figure 
4.4. The dotted line in this figure clarifies the symmetry between upper diagonal and 
the lower one. 
      
              
                    3
     0
                
                    2
     2
                     1
      1
                     0
      3
CI
DI
CII DII
II
I
 
Figure 4.4: Symmetric Game [39] 
CHOICE PAYOFF 
Testifies against the other & the other silent Immunity from prosecution (3) 
Remains silent & the other testifies Prison sentence for long time (0) 
Testifies against the other & the other testifies too Less punishment (1) 
Remains silent & the other remain silent too (cooperation) Lenient sentence (2) 
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       This property just found in the games where players take action simultaneously 
because each player has no information about the other's action. So that since there is 
no order between the two players, then the symmetric become possible. Prisoner 
Dilemma could be considered as a general game implemented in every case where the 
individual “defections” may cause in harmful results to others, such as in arms races, 
or cut-price marketing [39]. 
 
4.4.2 Wireless Local Loop (WLL) Sharing 
 
4.4.2.1 Scenario 
        Two operators of wireless local loop (WLL1, WLL2) have allocated frequency 
band for voice and data transferring. However, each operator has limited allocated 
band which is not enough for transmitting and receiving the data in satisfied rate 
throughout the run time. Therefore instead of increasing the bandwidth of each 
operator which result in an inefficient utilization of the frequency, we decided to 
allocate a frequency band can be shared between the operators.    
 
4.4.2.2 Strategic Form Representation 
      Players: WL1, WL2 
 Strategies: {Share, Not share} 
 Payoffs: Companies' profits 
4,1210,10
6,612,4
Not share
Share
Not share Share
WL2
WL1
 
Figure 4.5: Strategic Form Representation 
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Assumption 
 Each operator earns $10m from its customers 
 Sharing costs the operator $4m  
 Sharing makes an operator win $6m from competitor. 
 
4.4.2.3 Best Response for WL1 
 
   We notice that if WL2 doesn’t share, then WL1’s payoff is 10 or 12 (i.e. the best 
payoff for WL1 at this condition is 12 that is obtained when it shares), and if WL2 
shares, then WL1’s payoff is 4 or 6 (i.e. the best payoff for WL1 at this condition is 6 
that is obtained when it shares). 
    
 If WL2 shares                                          WL1 shares 
 If WL2 does not share                             WL1 shares 
 
     That means the best response for WL1 is {share} without care for the action would 
be taken by WL2. Therefore, the share strategy is dominant strategy and the game is 
called dominant game.    
 
4.5 Game Theory and Wireless Communications 
     
      Decentralized operation, self configuration, and power/energy awareness are 
common properties widely required in emerging wireless networks especially in the 
recent years when ad hoc networks took prominent position in the wireless 
communication which is (i.e. ad hoc network) a self-configuration decentralized 
authority [36]. Decentralized allocation of the communication resource is another 
problem added to the communication networks since communication resources are 
expensive then there is competitive among users on the allocations for each service in 
communications. It is difficult to make central control for resource allocation because 
of increasing in the communication scale and the requirements to best quality of 
service especially in the "newly emerging interactions between administrative domain 
and end user" leads to modeling new control systems which are decentralized. Recent 
researches are focused on finding new models of self-interested agents with 
decentralized decisions. These models need to treat with selfish decisions of the 
agents and suboptimal resource allocations that arise from the interaction of multiple 
selfish agents due to the absence of central control [41].   
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    Game theory as it is defined in [36] "The study of the interaction of autonomous 
agents". So it is clear for modern communications and wireless communications in 
particular, it is fruitless to spend efforts and time on studying the facilities offered by 
game theory to reach to the best algorithm and then models which considered the 
most suitable approach to tackle the problems of own decision that should be taken 
from each agent in communication networks. It is also required to make balance in the 
network actions by reaching to the rational decision and reducing selfishness 
behaviors of the decentralized agents. All that problems can be solved by analyzing 
the networks using game theory.  
     Traditionally, game theory analyzes all problems or systems that consist of 
competitive agents to find the solution to their conflict. Therefore, if we try to find 
what objectives that agents strive to achieve and what optimization they seek, we 
could set generally three goals. First agents or nodes – as we talking about 
communication system – seek only to their user's requirements (selfish behavior), 
second case, nodes look for ways to destroy the others' performance (malicious 
behavior). These two cases can be solved straight forward by game theory. Third case 
if nodes are interested in finding "greater good" of whole network, although this goal 
is shared among all nodes but still there are differences in the vision and idea about 
the network situation that yields in different actions taken by each nodes according to 
their own perspective on the current network (i.e. conflict on the best choice) [36].             
   
4.6 Cognitive and Game Theory 
 
        One of the important recent research topics is the efficient management and 
utilization of spectrum resource by dynamic spectrum access. The motivation beyond 
this research is the scarcity of available frequency and increasing demands for radio 
resource led to a way of thinking using the notion of spectrum sharing by unlicensed 
secondary users (SU). That means finding a method for dynamic access to unutilized 
frequency channels which are parts of allocated band to the primary license owner to 
be opportunistically used by SU. This operation is one of the tasks of 
cognition/management in the cognitive cycle, which mentioned in chapter 2 of this 
thesis. Dynamic spectrum access means at first detection of spaces in spectrum 
frequency bands and then using an efficient and fair way to share this available 
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frequency with unlicensed users (SU) [2]. Here the competition will be on different 
goals, one is the competition among PUs on how can each user get a benefit and how 
much earn from the spaces found in his band. Another goal is the competition among 
secondary users on utilizing available frequency from one PU selfishly.  
       Game theory here give a suitable solution since the problem is briefly a conflict 
among agents. It is one of the decentralized problems without cooperation among 
users so it is solved by non-cooperative game. Two important questions remain need 
to be answered here [2]: 
1- Is this game and scenario can find an equilibrium transmission? 
2- If the answer of question 1 is yes, how can the user compute it, using the local 
information only, in a distributed fashion?        
       
4.7 Summary 
      Game Theory is the main approach we have used in our work to prove the 
advantage of using dynamic spectrum allocation rather than non-dynamic methods 
and its effect on the efficient spectrum utilization. In chapter 6 of this thesis we could 
answer the two questions that have been mentioned above in the last section of this 
chapter. The work that is proposed in this thesis could find Nash equilibrium and the 
way of implementation.         
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Non-Dynamic Spectrum Allocations 
    Research continues in the area of spectrum utilization towards finding the best 
ways to exploit the available frequency as a resource of wireless communications. 
This work proposed two methods of utilization by spectrum sharing among multi 
users to compete on obtaining a maximum rate of sharing in the unoccupied 
frequency. First method has been proposed in this chapter. 
 
5.1 Methodology 
 
     In wireless system as in the other communication systems we can recognize if 
there is full usage of the allocated bandwidth by different ways, one of the simplest 
ways is by monitoring number of subscribers which use that band because we have 
prior information about maximum number of subscribers with each user. As it is 
known that there are peak hours at which most of subscribers occupy the allocated 
frequency and periods of inefficient frequency utilization. We can utilize the 
unoccupied frequency which allocated to a user according to the time and the number 
of subscribers in each time slot assuming that there are two periods of peak hours. 
Also we assume a threshold under which the user can rent its frequency to other users. 
    The scenario considers three users (first user, second
 
user, third user), the first user 
has the largest number of subscribers and frequency band so it becomes the provider 
which serves the other two users when it has free frequency. The first user signs a 
contract with second user and another one with third user to rent the available 
frequency to each user according to its traffic and number of maximum subscribers. 
The band would be shared then:         
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                 (5.1)  
                  (5.2) 
     Maxuser is maximum number of first user's subscribers;  is the threshold which is 
assumed equals 90% of the Maxuser; St is the current number of first user's 
subscribers at time slot t. The rate of the threshold here is assumed to be as large as 
possible to gain maximum spectrum utilization that can be obtained by this method.    
      When St Equals any number less than  then Shband will be more than zero, 
which means there will be sharing until the number of subscribers which used the 
band reaches .  
Shband represents the available band to be shared with second user and third user; it 
will be then distributed between them according to their number of subscribers. 
                  (5.3) 
                 (5.4) 
    Sh2 and Sh3 are the sharing bands to second and third users respectively; St2 is the 
current number of second user's subscribers; St3 is the current number of third user's 
subscribers at time slot t.  
    Another condition is when number of 2
nd
 user’s subscribers or 3rd user’s subscribers 
is very small, that means no need for sharing because at this case they have enough 
spectrums for their services and subscribers. This can be presented as minimum 
threshold for 2
nd
 or 3
rd
 users.   
   Figure 5.1 shows the flowchart that clarifies the procedure of this method.  
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Figure 5.1: Non-Dynamic Spectrum Allocation method 
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5.2 Results and Numerical Simulation 
     The results as shown in the figure 5.2, three users which are interested in spectrum 
sharing have the behaviors shown that the first user is the provider of the frequency 
from its allocated band when he doesn't use it. The maximum number of subscribers 
who occupy his band is assumed to be (1000 subscribers), the maximum number of 
subscribers who utilize the second user's band is assumed to be (450 subscribers), and 
the maximum number of subscribers who utilize the third user's band is assumed (350 
subscribers). Threshold appears where the number of subscribers is (900) represents 
90% of the maximum number of subscribers for the first user. First peak hour is 
around time interval (100), and the second one is around (400).         
    Sharing periods are clear in the lower graph of figure 5.2 which clarifies the 
difference between user's behavior before and after sharing. It is noted that there is 
sharing most of times except three periods, they are: (75-125), (250-325), (400-425).  
    The first and third periods are ones when the number of subscribers exceeded the 
threshold line which considers as a guard line for the first user (the frequency resource 
provider) to assure frequency availability to his main subscribers so that within these 
periods it can be considered as no frequency available.    
    In the second period the observer can notice that high rate of spectrum is available 
from the first user but there is no sharing because the second user doesn't need it at 
this period as he also has enough frequency for his services and subscribers so he 
doesn't need to pay to the first user.  
    Another note can be observed from figure 5.2 that is the rate of sharing is fixed 
depending on the number of subscriber of each user. When the available frequency 
rate is 41.4%, the rate of second user sharing is 25.7% and the third user rate is 
approximately 15.7%. The simulation has based on MatlabR2008 software. 
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Figure 5.2: Spectrum sharing with multiple subs. (non-dynamic allocation) 
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CHAPTER 6 
Spectrum sharing using Game theory  
6.1 Methodology 
    Game theory can be used as a method of modeling and optimization of wireless 
communications on a goal of competing performance among users to utilize the 
resource (i.e. spectral frequency) in an efficient way. 
     In this work game theory has been used to model an efficient utilization of the 
allocated spectrum which used by the licensed primary user (PU) mentioned that the 
problem is in spaces and holes exist in the licensed band which it is a function of time 
and space, what means there are portions of frequency band unused sometimes or 
spaces all the time. We assume that the environment sensing has been done and the 
spaces in the licensed band was detected so available frequency means the vacant 
channels which have been intelligently detected by cognitive radio technique as 
shown in figure 6.1.   
                                                    
 
Figure 6.1: Spectrum Allocation in time domain [19] 
 
    Figure 6.1 shows three time slots in the frame m of secondary user j.  
represents available length for user j to share or allocate a portion according to his 
requirement, where n is the number of slot. The amount of slot which available for j in 
each slot (n) is [19]: 
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               (6.1)  
   The secondary user j in slot n of frame m can share and get his portion of time by: 
                            (6.2)       
    By this way any SU can get sharing with primary user in a condition of interference 
avoidance with PU.  
 
6.1.1 Game's parameters in this work  
• Set of players   (I={1,2,3,….,N}):- 
Nodes or Users 
• Set of possible actions   (Ai) for each player:- 
{Share, Not Share} 
• Set of utility functions assign a number to each possible outcome (Ui). More 
      Desirable outcome means higher utility:- 
High rate of sharing and low coast 
6.1.2 Scenario of the work  
6.1.2.1 Sharing between PU and SUs 
      Primary user chooses a group of secondary users (SU) from many SUs which are 
interested in competing to share the spectrum frequency with the PU according to a 
pricing function to be computed by the primary user's administrator. Units with five 
categories have been determined depending on dimensions similar to those which 
considered in assessment of the frequency license as [2]:  
a) Bandwidth required (in MHz). 
b) Demand within the service region. 
c) Duration of the contract. 
d) Opportunity for growth of services within the service region. 
e) Cost of installing and providing service. 
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     Each SU takes his degree according to units he has collected from these five 
categories and will compete with other SU according to his degree. The priority will 
be granted to the SUs which has maximum degrees and the number of SUs in the 
group depending on the number that PU wants to share with them. The PU role would 
be ended until this stage and he should not force the SU group to a specific way of 
competing on sharing the available frequency among them but PU knows that one of 
the SUs in his group will be the Secondary PU as it will be explained in section 
6.1.2.3 of this chapter, therefore the suitable type of games in such scenario is non-
cooperative game.    
 
6.1.2.2 Non-Cooperative game theory 
       A non-cooperative game is one of the game types that its players have the ability 
to make independent decisions and the ability to cooperate among each other in a 
condition that the cooperation should be self-enforcing. If any contract among players 
is enforced through a third party, that game would be a cooperative game. It is 
adopted as a method in this work as assumed that there is no cooperation among users 
and the third party which is PU doesn't enforce their contract. 
6.1.2.3 Sharing among SUs 
S
e
n
s
in
g
 
T(ms)
SU1(SPU)
SU2
SU3
PU  
Figure 6.2: Spectrum sharing among users 
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        Each SU in the group has full information about strategies and payoffs of other 
SU in the same group. SU agrees to compete on sharing the available frequency and 
take the maximum rate of sharing in a condition he pays more than other SU in the 
group. SU who acts this role is called Secondary PU (SPU) as shown in figure 6.2; he 
shares frequency with PU and in the same time with other SUs to save time and 
manage the available frequency as SPU will serve other SUs by letting them share the 
rest frequency after he took the sharing rate he needs to assure each SU get the rate he 
wants when he needs. The network lifetime is assumed infinitely long and divided 
into individual time periods, represented by t for each t= 0, 1, 2…… ∞. Some of the 
SUs send a request at each time period t to share the spectrum with the PU, while the 
other SUs will prefer to share their requirement of the spectrum with the other SU, 
then the SU can decide if it is better to be secondary PU by sharing the spectrum with 
the PU, or remain as a SU to share spectrum with other SU and give a chance to 
another SU to serve others in the group (i.e. become SPU). The user's behavior 
depends on a factor defined as reputation (R).  
     Reputation (R) is affected by a user performance during any time periods (t) and in 
prior time periods (t-1).  R
i
t represents reputation of player i in some time period t. So 
mathematically, user reputation is defined as follows: 
 
                  (6.3)            
    
Where: 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, t ≥ 2; 
             w=1 or 0  
     Users' reputation is a value between "0" and "1" (including i.e. R
i
t Є [0, 1]), and 
the reputation of all users equals "0" at time slot t=0. When the user is interested to 
share the spectrum, w will take the value of "1"; otherwise, it will equal to "0". While 
α represents the user history depending on his previous time reputation according to 
the user action. Increasing in α value leads to rapidly increasing in reputation which 
gives an indication that the user has important need of sharing spectrum with PU to be 
SPU by taking high priority even if the reputation at that time is low value. Therefore, 
the value of α is used as a factor to improve the user's reputation quickly when there is 
an urgent demand in being SPU and share the PU with a high rate of sharing than 
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others and vice versa i.e. if the SPU needs rapidly reduce his rate of sharing and being 
an ordinary SU he should use high value of α.     
6.1.3 Nash Equilibrium 
     Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile ( ) at which no user may gain by 
unilaterally deviating such that [37],  
                                                                             (6.4) 
 
 Action of player  within the equilibrium 
            : Action of any player except  within the equilibrium 
             : Another action for player i 
     The infinitely repeated version of game is represented in this work which is the 
case when the game G is repeated continuously in successive time periods as G
∞
, so it 
needs to evaluate the Nash equilibrium of infinite game G
∞
.  
     The classical concept of Nash equilibrium points a way out of the endless cycle of 
speculation and counter-speculation as to what strategies the players should use. All 
the players in this game are users in the same network so we need a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium. The scenario assumes no coordination among user since it is difficult to 
coordinate among players who are not aware of any differences among themselves if 
they belong to the same network and they are from a single homogeneous population 
(i.e. all the users have equivalent capabilities and responsibilities) , therefore it is 
easier to achieve a symmetric Nash equilibrium.   
 
6.1.4 Strategic Form 
       Figure (6.3) represents two users strategic form of the game (assumed only two 
users for simplicity). The payoff of sharing is (– C) and of not sharing is (0), where    
– C is less than 0.  
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Figure 6.3: Strategic Form Representation 
 
 
     If all users are interested in sharing, this is undesirable Nash equilibrium case 
because it will be necessary to SUs to compete again and pay more to PU as money 
consider as a competition factor, then the loss will accrue to all SUs in money and 
time. If all users aren't interested in sharing, this is Nash equilibrium case because it 
saves time and money but, there are disadvantage from the practical view for the 
following reasons:- 
1- There is no benefit from the network when none of the users is interested in 
sharing the spectrum. 
2-   It is inappropriate to have network in which no user would make connection 
with the PU especially in practice nodes, when nodes always send some 
messages irrespective of outcome they obtain in return. 
 
6.1.5 SPU Probability 
       P is a parameter assigns the probability to the user who wants to share with PU 
and being SPU. The player who does not want to share he will be assigned (1-P). 
Payoff share denotes the expected payoff of the user in any time period t when it 
chooses the action {share}, that is: 
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                                                                                           (6.5) 
Where U is: the utility. 
 
This can show clearly the direct relation between user's reputation and his probability 
to become a SPU. 
      The expected payoff of the user who selects {not share} at any time period t is 
denoted as Payoff not share and equals: 
 
                     (6.6) 
 
    User's reputation when he wants to share is Rt
share
, while Rt
not share
 denotes the user's 
reputation if he does not want to share both of them at time period t. Then we can say 
according to equation 6.3 that: 
 
                                                                                   (6.7) 
 
And 
 
                  (6.8) 
 
    With positive probability, expected payoff of each user in equilibrium is its 
expected payoff to any of its actions (i.e. each user cannot gain from any action if he 
deviates from equilibrium). That is an important feature in mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium which means: 
 
                                                                             (6.9) 
 
From (6.5) and (6.6) we get: 
 
 =             (6.10) 
 
 
Using (6.7), (6.8), and (6.10) yields to: 
 
          (6.11) 
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Then finally P equals: 
 
                    (6.12)   
 
      It is clear that P isn't constant and depends on reputation of the user he gets from 
previous time period (t-1). As the assumption is no collusion among users, the mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium for this game is the mixed strategy pair (p, 1-p) for actions 
{want to share, does not want to share} respectively, and it is certainly better than the 
strategy of no user wants to share for the same reasons mentioned in section 6.1.4 
above. 
 
6.1.6 Features of the mixed strategy (p, 1-p) Nash Equilibrium     
    
1- Simplicity of calculations 
       The calculation of the probability to achieve the equilibrium among SUs 
based on aware which user will have a decision of sharing the available 
frequency with PU to be a SPU, the decision depends on the user's reputation at 
the end of the prior time period whether they should ask to share the offered 
spectrum or not. This is not fixed and repeated at each time period accordingly, 
the probability would be continuously changing from one time period to another 
depending on the prior reputation, and since users at each time period knows 
exactly what did they choose in the previous time period (i.e. share, not share); 
therefore, it is easy to calculate equation 6.3 which depends on previous 
reputation in time period t-1, then it is easy to achieve the equilibrium point 
among users.  
 
2- Tackle the competitive sharing problem 
    Without the submitted equilibrium each user behaves selfishly that is trying to 
share the spectrum rather than serves other. Obviously, each user in the network 
knows that the best strategy to him is to serve other users as little time as he 
could if he knew that others provide as little service as possible. If we assume 
C<< U then C can be ignored from (6.12) then: 
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                              (6.13) 
 
      That means the probability for each user to be a secondary PU is less than 
(0.5) i.e. less than 50% of all the time of sharing the available frequency with 
PU. Accordingly, no user can serve other users in the group most the time and as 
we proved that the best equilibrium is at least one of the users must share and be 
SPU, then when the maximum period of sharing, which is less than 50%, is over 
it is better to all user to choose another one to be the next SPU and serves others.   
  
3- Fairness in cost sharing 
     As in equation 6.13 appears that the probability is less than 50% which leads 
to overall system inefficiency because of selfish behavior of the SPU which 
likely does not accept all other users requests at the time when he is SPU if he 
needs all the available frequency at that time. So 50% of the requests may be 
turned down. By this Nash equilibrium it is assumed that the user who has a 
rejected request he tries at another SPU to be capable of serving the request and 
it is also (i.e. the probability of serving his request successfully) depending on 
his current reputation. On the other hand, there is fairness in the cost of system 
inefficiency that it is not caused by a single user, but it is shared among all the 
users in the group this fairness provided by the proposed Nash equilibrium. 
  
4- Fast addressing the spectrum to the right user 
 The theoretic model predicts that the best action of each user is to serve others 
and become SPU even when he isn't interested to share the spectrum with PU at 
that time, in which the decision of who will be SPU is depending on reputation. 
This will make balance between total services received from user with total 
services offered by that user. 
 
6.2 Results and Numerical Simulation 
     The results are obtained from theoretical models and implemented using 
MatlabR2008 software.  
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6.2.1 Reputation (R) effectiveness 
 
        User's reputation value is the major parameter in the calculations of this work as 
it was discussed in Section 6.1.2.3. In this section we shall see the effect of reputation 
on user's choice to share the PU (i.e. be secondary PU) or not. Figure 6.4 shows the 
node's (user's) reputation in each time period depending on their Nash strategy and 
using equation 6.3. 
       It is assumed that there are three users in the secondary users group which 
compete to share the available frequency provided by PU 
 
    Figure 6.4: Change in player’s reputation controlled by their Nash equilibrium                                   
strategies. 
 
    The reputation of all users at time interval "0" is "0", then at the beginning of the 
game with time interval t, user1 and user3 were interested in sharing, but they began 
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communication with different value of reputation, user1 began with value "0.8" which 
is higher than others reputation so he was the candidate to be a SPU, he was 
competing to get the higher rate and managing the available frequency which means 
serving user2 and user3 until the time interval t+3, while user3 at these intervals was 
a SU served by SPU (i.e. user1 here). User2 wasn't interested in sharing until time 
interval t+2 when he began increasing his reputation as an indication to his willing to 
share and be the next candidate for being SPU after user1.      
    The period between time intervals t+2 and t+3 has seen an increase in the 
reputation values of all the three users with different sharpness; therefore, while in the 
period t+3 to t+4 there was increasing in user2's reputation and decreasing in 
reputations of the others. So the probability of sharing to be SPU depends on the 
user's reputation at the end of last time period, and the reputation in the current time 
period determines whether the user will be serviced.    
      
     Same these results, but with longer time period can be implemented and its result 
shown in figure 6.5.   
 
Figure 6.5: changing player reputations over a longer time period. 
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   The time period is taken around nine hundred time intervals. Three users are 
assumed also to compete with each other; player one manage the available frequency 
and service other users (i.e. P2 and P3) as he considered SPU with highest reputation 
and player three have the lowest.  
     Random matrix generator was used to show different reputation when user 1 needs 
to share the spectrum for 80% of the time, user 2 is interested to share for 50% of the 
time while user 3 needs it only for 8% of the time. 
 
6.2.2 Alpha (α) effectiveness 
      Figure 6.6 shows the case for one user if he doesn't want to share with different 
values of α to clarify its effect on the reputation probability of the user. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Players reputation with respect to α, and the node is not interested in sharing    the 
offered spectrum 
 
      
       Low value of α raise the curve of reputation probability upwards, and since the 
case is asked not sharing, then the upper curve means gradually lose sharing. Opposite 
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situation is true in the lower curve where the reputation decreases rapidly means the 
user leaves his role as servicing other users (i.e. being SPU) faster. However, different 
values of α came from different decisions taken by the user in each time period as α is 
considered a factor effects on the value of reputation in each time interval, but Slow 
decreasing in the reputation probability and accordingly, slow lost of sharing gives 
network more stability.   
 
Figure 6.7: Players reputation with respect to α, and the node is interested in sharing the 
offered spectrum 
 
 
      Figure 6.7 shows how the change in the value of α affects the reputation of user, it 
is also depending on the desire of the user to share or not. High value of α shifts the 
reputation curve upwards, and means fast increasing in reputation which gives the 
user ability to quickly access the PU spectrum an being SPU. This explains the 
function of α that sets the level of importance to be given to user's performances and 
the comparison between current and past service record. If α is low, means past action 
of the user was more important up to the current time period  that yields in user's need 
to remain provides service as a way makes him able to maintain high reputation and 
sharing spectrum offered from the PU. If α is high, it will enable user to increase its 
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reputation easily in the period of being SPU and provide service to other users even 
when the history of his services provided to others was rather than the required level.    
     From results explained in figure 6.6 and figure 6.7 we can conclude that decreasing 
the value of α to be as low as possible can improve the system efficiency. 
 
6.2.3 Urgent Case 
       These cases are as it has explained in section (3.5) of this thesis when there is an 
urgent need from the PU to use his band which was rented to the SU group as an 
available frequency, there is a condition that in such cases the SU group must vacant 
the band to let the primary user who has the first priority in utilizing the band as he is 
the owner.  
      The proposed game theory method in this work treated with this problem by 
submit simple solution that makes the SU immediately leave the band he occupied by 
stopping sharing. Figure 6.8 shows the results of this solution.  
      
 
                    
Figure 6.8: Primary User needs his band for urgent case 
 
      We can see in time intervals between t+4 and t+6, the user lose sharing according 
to the primary user demand. It can easily return to sharing after the primary user 
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finishing his using and requesting SU to come back. As it is shown clearly, the 
reputation returns increasing at t+7 although the urgent period was between t+4 and 
t+6 because it depends on SU demand and if he is still interested in sharing. That 
means SU was not interested in sharing at t+6. 
    Figure 6.8 shows the results if we have one secondary user is interested in sharing. 
In case of a group of SU, It is not so difficult to implement because our proposed 
method in this work, assumes that the available frequency is managed by a secondary 
PU in each time period. So there is always one secondary user who leads the SU 
group and becomes responsible of frequency sharing with PU as well as with other 
SUs in the group.  
     Figure 6.9 shows the same results in figure 6.8 but for multi-SU. It is easier to PU 
and faster response when he treated with one user rather than with group. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Primary User needs his band for urgent case with multi-SU 
 
 
6.3 Comparison between Dynamic and Non-Dynamic Methods  
 
     In this section as we explained in chapter 5 of this thesis the notes found in the 
results of Non-Dynamic allocation method, we print here some preliminary results on 
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the comparison between the game theory method and non-dynamic allocation method 
that have been used in this work as shown in figure 6.10 below: 
                            
Figure 6.10: Comparison between the two methods 
    
    Lower graph in figure 6.10 represents the possible utilization rate of the available 
frequency which is between 0% and 45% using the first method (i.e. Spectrum 
sharing depending on number of subscribers). Whereas the upper graph represents the 
spectrum utilization rate using game theory (i.e. 2
nd
 method), it is between 55% and 
95%. 
    The results show that no waste will be in the spectrum using the second method 
because the rate of utilization wouldn’t be less than 55%. While in the first method we 
can see that there are some periods recorded 0% of utilization. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Conclusion and Future Work 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
      Spectrum sharing between a primary user and secondary users is the emerging 
solution of spectrum allocation in the communications systems. Further issues arise 
even when we use cognitive radio devices to sense available frequency such as 
interference among users, decentralized nodes and the problem of urgent case when 
primary user needs his sharing band suddenly. However, in our work we have 
proposed two mechanism of spectrum sharing and made a comparison between them. 
Sharing according to number of subscriber of each user and sharing between primary 
and multi-secondary users. In game theory approach, a simple non-cooperative game 
mechanism based on a node’s reputation to tackle the problems of competitive 
spectrum sharing which is another problem arises after detecting the unused frequency. 
The model presented predicts the best strategy even for selfish users serving others.  
        Optimum Nash equilibrium strategies were predicted using game theory for 
selfish nodes such that maximizing their profits. Individual nodes behavior and 
performance of the overall system can be also presented by using game theory. Several 
significant advantages are found in the proposed game theoretic solution of the 
problem of spectrum sharing problem such as fairness, simplicity in implementation, 
and ease of calculating optimum strategies. We assumed that all users with all service 
types have the same cost and utility attached with serving and obtaining services. The 
results and numerical simulations show that the game theory model is better than the 
other model which depends on number of subscriber in sense of optimal utilization and 
sharing.  
      Urgent case is also addressed as a problem may be facing the secondary users if the 
primary emerges again in the area of sharing. 
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7.2 Limitations and Features  
    Referring to the results in chapter 5 and 6 we can observe limitations and features of 
the two methods proposed in this work as follows: 
                                       
7.2.1 Limitations on the first method (Spectrum Sharing depending on number of   
subscribers): 
 
1- The competition depends on the number of subscribers that means the user who has    
more subscribers get higher ratio of available frequency. 
2- The rate of sharing is fixed and may cause in more waste of spectrum. 
3- The period between threshold and the peak hour can’t be utilized. 
 
7.2.2 Features of the second method (Spectrum sharing using Game Theory) 
 
1- The competition depends on the reputation which gives it flexibility. 
2- Probability (P<50%) prevents other secondary users from selfish behaviour.  
3- There is no rate of sharing & it isn’t fixed, that made us sure that no user will get 
sharing unless he wants it at that time which gives us trust in optimal utilization 
because game theory means rational decision. 
4- No threshold means100% of the available frequency can be utilized.  
5- This method can be used as a new method of spectrum allocation. 
6- It can be used by regulatory bodies as spectral management method especially in the 
countries that still have free frequency bands. 
7- Easier and faster unload frequency band in urgent case. 
 
7.3 Future Work 
 
 Optimum allocation for SU will be used in cognitive radio access for future 
work that based on a non-cooperative game theoretic load balancing algorithm 
or 'Spectrum Load Balancing' as it is used and referred to in [19]. Here each 
user determines his optimum fraction of his requirement with the consideration 
of other user demands and allocations. By this linking with our work we can 
enable the SPU to serve other SUs in his group with optimum spectrum 
utilization. 
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 Heterogeneity of service types and users is the way will be chosen to develop 
more models that take into consideration the desired type. When the 
heterogeneity is the over-riding factor in protocol design, the applicability of 
game theory in cognitive radio systems would be investigated. 
Figure 7.1: Heterogeneity of service types and users 
 
       Figure 7.1 shows the system including three types of users can be 
implemented to the same scenario of spectrum sharing using game theory that 
has been proposed in this thesis. The problem will be in obtaining previous 
knowledge about the performance of each user and in calculating the probability 
of being secondary primary user (SPU) which depends on many factors because 
of differences in type, performance and capacity of each user. If the calculations 
result in selfish behavior, then it will be limitation in using specific type rather 
than another type.   
 
 Multi-Primary users also one of the suggested work to find alternative solution 
for secondary users in urgent case to share the spectrum they need with another 
primary user in the period of urgency.  
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Figure 7.2: Spectrum Sharing using Game Theory with more than one PU 
 
     In urgent case when the primary user needs its frequency that has been 
rented to the secondary users which they (i.e. SUs) loose the resource of their 
service suddenly what means stopping their services. It needs as an urgent case 
for the SUs to go on and find an alternative solution by looking for another 
resource of spectrum from another primary user as illustrated in figure 7.2. 
PU1 is the main primary user which shares his spectrum with SU1, SU2, and 
SU3 while PU2 is the alternative user which can support SU1, SU2, and SU3 
with the required resource of spectrum. Calculations must take into 
consideration the time delay for exchange and the compatibility of equipments 
used with each PU. The price is another issue that may be different from PU to 
another one.  
 
 In future work the practical linking of the different sensing with the game 
theory-based and spectrum allocations especially using of cyclostationary 
sensing can be investigated further. 
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